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Keynes, Chicago and Friedman 
  
Chapter 1: The Initial Controversyi  
 
Robert Leeson 
  
14 August 2002 
 
1.1 Introduction 
During the middle third of the twentieth century, the ideas of John Maynard Keynes 
and those who described themselves as “Keynesians” acquired a profound influence 
over both the economics profession and the macroeconomic policy process.  After the 
publication of Milton Friedman’s (1956) Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, 
Keynesians were obliged to compete with “monetarists” for policy and intellectual 
influence.ii  These two volumes examine aspects of this counter-revolution by 
focusing on Friedman’s claim that he was merely formalising the macroeconomic 
ideas of the first generation Chicago School, at whose “feet” he “sat” in 1932-3 and 
1934-5 (Friedman chapter 7 [1972/1974], 163).     
 
In his introductory chapter ‘The Quantity Theory of Money – A Restatement’ 
Friedman (chapter 2 [1956], 3-4) launched the monetarist counter-revolution 
accompanied by the assertion that “Chicago was one of the few academic centres at 
which the quantity theory continued to be a central and vigorous part of the oral 
tradition throughout the 1930’s and 1940’s”.  Friedman sought to “nurture” the 
revival of the quantity theory by linking it to this Chicago “oral tradition”.  According 
to Friedman the “flavor” of this oral tradition was captured in a model in which the 
quantity theory was “in the first instance a theory of the demand for money”.  
Friedman did not intend to offer “a full justification” for his “assertion” adding that to 
“the best of my knowledge no systematic statement of this theory as developed at 
Chicago exists, though much of it can be read between the lines of [Henry] Simons’ 
and [Lloyd] Mints’s writings”.  Friedman also enlisted the names of two co-editors of 
the Journal of Political Economy (JPE) Frank Knight and Jacob Viner (1929-45) in 
support of his assertion. 
 
Don Patinkin studied at Chicago between 1941-47, a few years after Friedman; both 
had been taught monetary economics at Chicago by Mints.iii  Patinkin analysed his 
1944 notes from Mints’ Economics 330 and found no evidence to sustain Friedman’s 
account of the nature of the Chicago monetary tradition.  There had previously been 
other attempts to construct oral traditions and lineages; but none generated as much 
heat – and light - as this.  This introductory chapter sets the Patinkin-Friedman dispute 
in its political and ideological context and also describes some of these other lineage 
assertions and disputes.    
 
Patinkin (chapter 5 [1969/1981], 241, 253, 256) began his assault with “an apology 
for being over a decade late”.  The “nominal” justification was the recent publication 
of Friedman’s (chapter 4 [1968]) encyclopaedia essay on the quantity theory in which 
the Chicago School, its individual members, and Studies in the Quantity Theory of 
Money are not mentioned.iv  Indeed, in the offending sentence of that encyclopaedia 
entry, Friedman (chapter 4 [1968], 439) did not even refer to his own work.  Instead, 
he referred to an essay by Harry Johnson: “The postwar period has also seen a return 
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to analysis in terms of the quantity equation accompanied by a reformulation of the 
quantity theory that has been strongly affected by the Keynesian analysis of liquidity 
preference (Johnson 1962)”.v  Since Patinkin acknowledged that in 1968 Friedman 
had already “admitted” his “intellectual indebtedness” to “modern Keynesian 
monetary theory” this suggests that Patinkin’s assault may have a “real” cause: the 
increased potency of Friedman’s macroeconomic advocacy and ideology, relative to 
the mid-1950s.  In a posthumously published essay, Patinkin (1995, 361-2) stated that 
in his judgement, Friedman returned to Chicago in 1946 “to continue the school’s 
fundamental ideological advocacy of free-market economic liberalism”.   
 
Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money was published mid-way between Herbert 
Hoover’s defeat in 1932 and Ronald Reagan’s victory in 1980.vi  Hoover’s defeat by 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1932 produced a “political watershed” equivalent to 
that later created by Reagan’s victory in 1980: the 1860-1932 era of Republican 
ascendancy gave way to the 1932-1980 era of Democrat ascendancy (Friedman and 
Friedman 1980, 331-2; 1984, 4).vii  Reagan’s election was regarded as the death of the 
New Deal (Graham 1989, 75); it initiated a period of increased policy influence for 
Friedman and other Hoover Institution economists.   
   
Political watersheds often occur in conjunction with changes in the intellectual 
climate.  The President and Chairman of Citibank recalled that as a result of the 
research undertaken by Friedman and his students “every Friday afternoon, a kind of 
eerie silence settled over the normally boisterous trading rooms on Wall Street.  The 
computer screens started going blank at about 4.20 as traders waited for the 4.30 
announcement of the M1 and M2 figures.  The quantity theory of money had come to 
Wall Street” (Wriston 1998, 2).  Almost half a century earlier, the Chicago Tribune 
reported that after Roosevelt’s victory the quantity theory had come to Washington 
with the “brains trust”: “All Washington is going to school to the professors … 
Debutantes hang on their exposition of the quantitative theory of money” (cited by 
Leuchtenburg 1968 [1933], 50).viii   
 
Three students of the first generation largely created the second-generation Chicago 
School: Friedman, W. Allen Wallis and George Stigler.  According to Stigler (1969, 
229), an incumbent was “A person of the liveliest interest to the outcumbents”.  In 
1952, Adolf Berle, a prominent New Dealer, attempted to persuade Senator Paul 
Douglas, an important inter-war University of Chicago economist, to seek the 
Democratic Party Presidential nomination (Schwartz 1987, 295; see also Douglas 
1972, 193-4).  Twelve years later Berle (1973 [1964], 795) confided to his diary: 
“Goldwater has picked up Milton Friedman, the economist of the University of 
Chicago, straight out of the old laissez faire group.  He will make the campaign a 
referendum on everything that has happened since Roosevelt was elected in 1932, and 
his crowd mean to go for broke … The worst elements in American reaction have 
their day”.   
 
1.2 The Importance of Lineage and Tradition 
Friedman sought to explain the “transition from the overwhelming defeat of Barry 
Goldwater in 1964 to the overwhelming victory of Ronald Reagan in 1980 - two men 
with essentially the same programme and the same message” (Friedman and Friedman 
1982, viii).  One partial explanation was lineage.  Goldwater was pilloried for using the 
phrase “Extremism in defence of liberty is no vice”; Friedman reflected that the 
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reaction would have been so different “if Goldwater had introduced the statement by 
‘as Cicero said more than two thousand years ago’” (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 
368-9).ix   
 
Friedman (1953, 3-5) found a lineage for his methodology of positive economics in 
John Neville Keynes’ (1891) Scope and Method of Political Economy.  Friedman 
suggested that the “progress” of such a method of research could allow differences of 
opinion among “disinterested citizens” to be “eliminated”, unlike value judgement 
disputes, about which “men can ultimately only fight”.x  Friedman (1977) also found 
a lineage with which to conclude his Nobel Prize Lecture - a quotation from Pierre du 
Pont to the French National Assembly of 1790: “Gentlemen, it is a disagreeable 
custom to which one is too easily led by the harshness of the discussion to assume evil 
intentions.  It is necessary to be gracious as to intentions; one should believe them 
good and apparently they are; but we do not have to be gracious at all to inconsistent 
logic or to absurd reasoning.  Bad logicians have committed more involuntary crimes 
than bad men have done intentionally”.  But Friedman was suspected of attempting to 
perpetrate an ideological coup as du Pont and his fellow Physiocrats had done.xi  Thus 
some of Friedman’s opponents exhibited “a bitterness beyond reason” – attributed by 
Donald McCloskey (1986) to the widespread professional acceptance of Friedman’s 
methodology of positive economics. 
      
According to a University of Chicago Public Policy Pamphlet discussion of monetary 
policy, “tradition … is stronger than logic” and could thus be a crucial factor in the 
“tactical” process by which policy is formulated and propagated (Whittlesey 1935, 
24-5).  Tradition and lineage were important not only to Friedman but also to his 
fellow Mt. Pelerin Society libertarians.  In his Opening Address to the Society, 
Frederick von Hayek (1967 [1947], 158) highlighted the importance of lineage by 
proposing the name “Acton-Tocqueville Society”.xii  In a University of Chicago 
Public Policy Pamphlet, Hayek (1939, 24, n15) stated that “There can be little doubt 
that the existence of firm tradition has materially helped to preserve free institutions 
in the Western world, just as its absence has contributed to their downfall in central 
Europe”.xiii  According to Stigler (1988) “There was no Chicago School of Economics 
when the Mt. Pelerin Society first met”.     
 
While Friedman’s (1953; 1957) methodology and permanent income hypothesis 
entered the economics mainstream, his monetary research was initially regarded as the 
work of an eccentric.  Meghnad Desai (1981, 2) went as far as to suggest that prior to 
the publication of A Monetary History of the United States (Friedman and Schwartz 
1963), Friedman’s use of the quantity theory was regarded as “a peculiar Chicago 
madness, indulgently mocked”.  According to Robert Barro (1998, 5), Friedman had 
been treated as a “right-wing midwestern crank.  Most of the derision applied to his 
views on money”.   
 
Neither Desai nor Barro were dispassionate observers; but according to an 
unpublished Massachusetts Institute of Technology doctoral dissertation on the 
‘Demand and Supply Functions for Money in the United States’, the implications of 
Friedman’s results were “limited because the definitions and formulations used are 
somewhat idiosyncratic, thus insulating his work from the main stream of research 
effort in the monetary area … we here neglect our conceptual misgivings about the 
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Friedman approach, allow him his definitions for the sake of argument, and attempt to 
show that his approach appears to be empirically inferior” (Teigen 1962, 31, 170).xiv   
 
Eccentrics or “cranks” can help define the boundaries of professional respectability.  
Prior to 1936, acceptance of the quantity theory was, for some, the touchstone of 
professional reliability.  For example, Edwin Kemmerer (1935, 66), of Princeton 
University, concluded that “it can be said, without fear of successful contradiction, 
that a large majority of scientific economists, both in the United States and abroad, 
who have worked intensively in the field monetary theory, accept some form of the 
quantity theory of money”.xv  Kemmerer (1934a, 174, 51, 56, 77, viii, 151) was 
alarmed by his belief that the U.S. money supply had increased by 59% between June 
1926 and March 1934, resulting in a “59-cent dollar”.  The Federal Reserve banks 
could, he argued, control the money supply but not their velocities: “You can lead a 
horse to water but you can’t make him drink”.xvi  These velocities were “questions of 
business confidence and prospects, of hopes and fears, of emotions and prejudices”.  
According to Kemmerer (1933, 134; 1934b) there was a direct relationship between 
velocity and business confidence and therefore the “vigorous reflation program of the 
Federal Reserve banks” had been counter-productive because it had weakened the 
confidence of the business community”.xvii   
 
Kemmerer (1934a) opposed “the money cranks … a mass of barnacles so bright in 
appearance and with such clinging properties”.  After attending the 1932 American 
Economic Association (AEA) proceedings, Richard Kahn (30 January 1933) wrote to 
Keynes from Chicago complaining that American economists were “still living in the 
Dark Ages.  It was all about the helplessness of trying to expand the economy … the 
dead hand of Kemmerer hung heavy on most of the proceedings … I am thinking that 
the only way to save humanity is to lead a campaign against the Quantity Theory.  I 
tried it on the [University of Chicago] Graduate Club here and they didn’t very much 
like it, but didn’t quite know what to say.  These people can see nothing absurd in the 
president elect being 'opposed to currency inflation but in favour of credit inflation'.  I 
am enjoying the spectacle”.xviii   
 
Keynes (JMK XIII [1935], 546, 552; 1936, 351) realised that cranks could also be 
resurrected as neglected heretics “which the classics have treated as imbecile for the 
last hundred years ... I am not really being so great an innovator, except as against the 
classical school, but have important predecessors and am returning to an age-long 
tradition of common sense ... which deserves rehabilitation and honour”.xix  As a 
result of the post-1936 Keynesian revolution, adherents of the quantity theory were 
relegated to “crank” status.  Until the late 1960s, that is, when Friedman was 
transformed from “pariah to priest” (Barro 1998, 6).  Entering the temple, he turned 
the tables on those who had changed “Money” into Keynesian “Macroeconomics”.  
For this rebellion against the Keynesian Neoclassical Synthesis, Patinkin sought to 
have him, if not crucified, then permanently separated from his claimed parentage.xx      
 
Patinkin explained to his students at the University of Western Ontario (19th 
November 1973) that with respect to “Friedman vs. everyone else – after having said 
everything they could think about one another, they started on their respective 
intellectual forefathers – and in this context, the worst thing that you can say about 
your opponent that he’s a bastard – or at best an intellectual bastard.  That he really 
isn’t the son of the intellectual father he is claiming for himself.  That he really 
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doesn’t understand the teachings of his alleged fathers – and that his opponent is 
really the legitimate descendent” (see Backhouse 2002).xxi   
 
1.3 Monetarists and Keynesians  
Those who opposed the New Deal were tainted by the “mark of Cain” (Conkin 1968, 
51); until shortly before Patinkin’s assault, the ‘mark of Chicago’ was perceived to 
have inspired Friedman’s monetarism.  For example, Walter Heller (1969, 40-1), 
chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) under both President Kennedy 
and President Johnson, stated that “the Chicago School just goes rolling along” with 
“great consistency over the years”.  Heller’s remarks were made in a widely reported 
debate on monetary policy with Friedman on 14 November 1968, a few days after 
Richard Nixon’s election victory.  In response, Friedman (1969, 45) - obviously 
aware that his remarks would be scrutinised for hints about Nixon’s economic policy - 
declared that he would “speak not for any mythical Chicago School, nor for any 
administration or candidate, but for myself”.   
 
Friedman (1968) had just completed the theoretical structure of the monetarist 
counter-revolution with his “natural rate of unemployment” AEA Presidential 
Address.  After Nixon’s victory it was widely expected that Friedman would exert a 
considerable influence on American economic policy.  Paul McCracken, Nixon’s 
CEA chairman, declared himself to be “Friedmanesque” (cited by Blumenthal 1986, 
109, 111).  When Arthur Burns became Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board this 
was regarded (somewhat inaccurately) by James Tobin (chapter 10 [1981], 30) as the 
“1970 conversion” to monetarism.  Between 1973-5, there were two monetary 
revolutions (domestic and international) which were closely connected to Friedman’s 
advocacy: the destruction of the post war system of fixed exchange rates and the 
widespread adoption of the rule of targeting monetary aggregates based on the 
expectation that the demand for money was a stable relationship.xxii   
 
Since Simons’ (1962 [1936]) classic essay on “Rules Versus Authorities in Monetary 
Policy” the Chicago School had been regarded as the “rules party” (Selden 1962, 
323).xxiii  According to Simons (1948 [1945], 308) the New Deal had delegated arbitrary 
power to a series of agencies.  This “high-road to dictatorship” was “terrifying” for “an 
old-fashioned liberal”.  Elevating the “government of men” over the “government of 
rules” was tantamount to “accepting or inviting fascism”.  Simons was interpreted as 
undertaking a process of “public indoctrination with the new rules of the game so that 
a new ‘religion of money’ can be built up ‘around which might be regimented strong 
sentiments against tinkering with the currency’” (Gideonse 1938, 13).xxiv   
 
An early version of Friedman’s case for flexible exchange rates can be found in 
Simons’ (1934, 53-4) ‘Money and the New Deal’.  Mints (1950, 115) also stated that 
“the essential problem of monetary policy can be stated as that of ‘rules versus 
discretion’”.  According to Friedman (chapter 7 [1972/1974], 163) this Chicago 
tradition provided immunity from the Keynesian virus: “the small minority of 
economists who did not succumb to the Keynesian revolution consisted 
disproportionately of Chicago-trained economists … so far as policy was concerned, 
Keynes had nothing to offer those of us who sat at the feet of Simons, Mints, Knight 
and Viner”.   
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Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money and Friedman’s “Restatement” of the 
quantity theory was published in the same year as Money, Interest, and Prices – 
Patinkin’s (1956) attempt to codify the Keynesian Neoclassical Synthesis.  In the 
ensuing controversy, Patinkin sought to provide ‘A Restatement of Keynesian 
Economics’.  Patinkin (27 January 1958; 19 August 1957) informed John Hicks that 
he was unambiguously an adherent of the Keynesian revolution but that he thought 
“we strengthen the revolution by dropping the false issue of ‘unemployment 
equilibrium’ of which so much has been made in the past … Keynesian economics 
can and should be restated in a way that it remains valid even after we do take account 
of” the real balance effect [emphasis in original].xxv     
 
Shortly afterwards, Friedman (1965 [1958], 106) argued before the Joint Economic 
Committee of the United States Congress that the money supply should grow at a 
“predesignated rate”.  Further supporting evidence was presented in ‘The Demand for 
Money: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results’ (Friedman 1959).  Patinkin (16 
November 1959) then wrote to Friedman to complain that “As an aside, I might add 
that my only other objection to your [1956] essay is its refusal to recognise the 
strongly Keynesian flavour of the analysis it presents … to me it seems that with 
perhaps one exception (Karl Schlesinger) an exposition with the contents and spirit of 
yours could not have been written (and was not written) before Keynes.  I find it 
particularly difficult to accept your implication that your essay represents the kind of 
thing that was taught at Chicago by Knight, Viner, Simons and Mints.  My own 
recollections are different”.xxvi   
 
Shortly after he returned to Chicago, Friedman attempted to read “between the lines” 
in connection with Wesley Clare Mitchell.  Friedman sought to defend the Burns-
Mitchell National Bureau of Economic Research methodology, which had been 
derided by the structural econometricians as “measurement without theory” 
(Koopmans 1947).xxvii  Mitchell induced in Friedman (1950, 465, 489, 478-9) a 
feeling of “exasperation, because numerous significant theoretical insights are so 
carefully hidden”.xxviii  He attempted to rescue Mitchell’s work and to elevate it as “a 
contribution to economic theory of the first magnitude”.  Friedman believed that “the 
theoretical insights are there after one pierces their protective coloring”.  He explained 
the process by which he intended to enable “economists … to rediscover [the] 
essential elements” of Mitchell’s work: “The aim of the free rendering that follows is 
to show that an integrated business-cycle theory can be constructed from – or read 
into – Mitchell’s work and to express it in terms that bring out its similarities and 
dissimilarities to other existing theories”. 
 
His Chicago colleague, Lloyd Metzler (25th September 1950), complained in 
correspondence to Friedman that “I do not share your views concerning the relative 
merits of Mitchell’s theory and later theories of the business cycle.  I doubt very much 
whether you would be able to interpret Mitchell as you have done in the absence of 
later developments by Keynes and others”.xxix  Friedman later admitted that “I tried … 
in the article I wrote on [Mitchell] to sort of play fast and loose and try to construct an 
analytical theory”.xxx  But the disagreement with Metzler - like the disagreement with 
Patinkin prior to 1968 – remained in the private domain.   
 
Likewise, Nicholas Kaldor (1970, 54, n1) referred to an anti-Monetarist tradition, 
which remained quasi-oral (included his “written and oral evidence” to the 1958 
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Radcliffe Committee).  But Friedman could no longer be dismissed so casually: “It is 
a tribute to Friedman’s growing influence (in the U.K., as well as the U.S.) that I 
thought it worth-while to publish a paper solely devoted to a criticism of his views in 
1970 which I did not think worth-while twelve years before”.   
 
Twelve years after the publication of Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money 
Patinkin became determined to bring the issue to a head in the public domain.  On 27 
November 1968, he wrote to Friedman enclosing a draft of an essay that was to be 
published in the first issue of the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (JMCB) in 
which he documented what he believed to be the falsity of Friedman’s account of the 
Chicago tradition (chapter 5 [1969/1981]).  Harry Johnson (chapter 8 [1971]), 
Friedman’s Chicago colleague (1959-1977) and former editor of the JPE, expanded 
upon Patinkin’s essay to provide a wider critique of Friedman’s scholarship and 
integrity.   
 
Friedman (1962) dedicated Capitalism and Freedom to his two children “and their 
contemporaries who must carry the torch of liberty on its next lap”.  Johnson (chapter 
8 [1971], 11) concluded that Patinkin had shown “specifically that the Chicago 
quantity theorists – Simons and Mints - were no different from their quantity theory 
colleagues elsewhere in these respects.  There was no lonely light constantly burning 
in a secret shrine on the Midway, encouraging the faithful to assemble in waiting for 
the day when the truth could safely be revealed to the masses; that candle was made, 
and not merely lit, only when its light had a chance of penetrating far and wide and 
attracting new converts to the old time religion”.   
 
The Patinkin-Johnson assaults provided anti-monetarist ammunition to many of 
Friedman’s opponents including Tobin and Paul Samuelson (both associated with the 
Keynesian Neoclassical Synthesis and the policy process in President Kennedy’s 
White House).  In his JPE obituary of Viner, Samuelson (1972, 11) asserted that it 
was “a perversion of history to believe that there was an oral tradition at the 
University of Chicago which had already anticipated the valid nucleus of Keynesian 
analysis”.  Tobin (chapter 10 [1981], 30) regretted that “the flaws Johnson detected 
[in monetarism] have not yet proved fatal”.   
 
1.4 Early Disputes over the Quantity Theory  
From its formation, the Chicago Economics department and its journal, the JPE, had 
been involved in heated controversy over the quantity theory.  J. Laurence Laughlin 
the founding chairman of the department and the founding editor of the JPE (1892-5) 
was a relentless critic of the quantity theory (Dorfman 1959, 419; Bornemann 1940, 
4).  Laughlin’s (1903) work stimulated Kemmerer (1907) and Irving Fisher (1911) to 
restate and defend the quantity theory (Mehrling 1997, 32).  Throughout his career 
Laughlin engaged Fisher on the quantity theory: Chicago versus Yale “with the sides 
reversed” (Friedman 1974, 14-15).xxxi   
 
Laughlin took his campaign to the public; taking two years leave (1911-13) from 
Chicago to act as full-time chairman of the National Citizens League to press for 
banking reform.  Friedman (1987) noted that Laughlin’s economics was “marred by 
dogmatic and rigid opposition to the quantity theory”.  Paul Douglas (1972, 42, 334) 
arrived at the University of Chicago in 1920: “over the years I developed a greater 
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faith in [Laughlin’s] ideas and even less reliance on the rigid quantity theory as the 
sole factor in the general price level”.   
 
Presumably referring to Keynes (JMK 1983, 11 [1911], 375-76), Laughlin complained 
about “the recrudescence of the archaic quantity theory of money in Great Britain” 
(Laughlin 1918, 117).  In The Federal Reserve Act its Origin and Problems, Laughlin 
(1933, 222, 229, 231-2) continued to abuse the quantity theory, and Fisher and his 
“unquestionable error”.  Moreover, Laughlin asserted that “the American inflationist 
school of Irving Fisher has called in for reinforcement … John Maynard Keynes”.  
Keynes’ “remarks on the abandonment of the British gold standard and the sacerdotal 
nature assigned to the influence of the quantity of money on prices are scarcely 
credible”.   
 
H. Parker Willis acquired his aversion to the quantity theory from Laughlin, his 
Chicago colleague and former teacher (Dorfman 1959, 314-5).xxxii  Laughlin and 
Willis were two of the architects of the Federal Reserve Act (White 1983, 115).  
Willis became Secretary of the Federal Reserve Board (1918-22) and was the 
founding President of the Stable Money Association (Fisher 1934, 106, 360; 
Sandilands 1990, 64).xxxiii  Laughlin, however, had to exert his influence on the 
Federal Reserve Board via Willis because a Democrat was in the White House and to 
the “Democrats, Laughlin was persona non grata” (Mitchell 1941, 878; Friedman 
1987).xxxiv  
 
W. Allen Wallis (1976 [1964], 102) noted that Friedman was “persona non grata in 
the Federal Reserve Board”.  Citing Mints (1945), Friedman (1960, 26, 43) argued 
that the Federal Reserve Board had been “set up by men mostly wedded to that 
ubiquitous fallacy, the real bills doctrine”.  According to Friedman, this fallacy had 
contributed to the confusion “between what might be called the ‘monetary’ effects of 
monetary policy – the effect on the stock of money – and the ‘credit’ effects – the 
effects on recorded rates of interest and other conditions in the credit market … An 
ancient example of the confusion is the ‘real bills’ fallacy already referred to.  More 
recently, the change in economic ideas associated with the name of John Maynard 
Keynes led to an almost complete neglect of the ‘monetary’ effects of monetary 
policy and concentration on the ‘credit’ effects”.   
 
According to Friedman and Anna Schwartz (1963, 193), one of the consequences of 
this acceptance of the real bills doctrine was that the Federal Reserve began 
operations “with no effective legislative criteria for determining the total stock of 
money.  The discretionary judgement of a group of men was inevitably substituted for 
the quasi-automatic discipline of the gold standard … Little wonder, perhaps, that the 
subsequent years saw so much backing and filling, so much confusion about purpose 
and power, and so erratic an exercise of power”. 
 
Laughlin was an advocate of “an extreme form of the real bills doctrine” (Mehrling 
1997, 35-6; see also Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 192, n7).  Mints (1950, 6-7; 1945, 
5) regarded the real bills doctrine as “almost wholly fallacious”; it was “utterly 
subversive of any rational attack on the problems of monetary policy”.  This aversion 
to the real bills doctrine (and the incompetent discretion associated with it) linked the 
dominant monetary economists of the first and second-generation Chicago School 
“rules party” (Mints and Friedman) to members of the third generation.                   
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Friedman was not the first Chicago economist to offer a restatement of the quantity 
theory by reading between the lines.  In the JPE, Willis (1896, 448, 441) noted that 
the quantity theory was “gradually losing ground amongst economists” but “had lost 
none of its hold on upon the public mind”.  Willis sought to provide “a clear 
restatement of the quantity theory”.  He noted the difficulties involved in such a 
project but concluded that “by comparison of the various bits of exposition on the 
subject a theory fairly consistent with itself may, if too great nicety in the use of terms 
is not demanded, be culled from the recent writings of believers in the doctrine”.  
Friedman (1972, 12) later repeated Fisher’s rebuttal to Laughlin that “the quantity 
theory is in essence correct.  What it needs is to be restated not rejected”.  It was this 
‘Restatement’ that Friedman (chapter 2 [1956], 3, 21) provided, by “reading between 
the lines” as Willis had done six decades before.   
 
Nor was Friedman the first economist to make an assertion about the existence of a 
quantity theory oral tradition.  On two occasions, Keynes made similar assertions: in his 
review of Fisher’s Purchasing Power of Money (1911) and in his obituary of Alfred 
Marshall (JMK 1983, XI [1911], 375-76; X [1924], 189; see also Whitaker 1975, 164-
78).  According to Johnson, Friedman self-consciously imitated the tactics of the 
Keynesian revolution so as to further his counter-revolution.xxxv  Johnson (1970, 85-6, 
107 n48) speculated that during his year “as a visitor at Cambridge [1954], Friedman 
became enamoured of the ‘Cambridge oral tradition’ as a concept permitting the 
attribution to an institution of a wisdom exceeding that displayed in its published 
work, and unconsciously stole a leaf from Cambridge’s book for the benefit of his 
own institution”.xxxvi   
 
Edward Cannan (1927 [1922], 311), of the London School of Economics (LSE), 
noted that to “outsiders” the “Cambridge School of Economics” appeared “as 
somewhat of a ‘sect’”.xxxvii  Cannan also attempted to expropriate the analysis of 
money demand as an LSE oral tradition after having earlier disagreed with Keynes.  
In a review of Keynes’ Tract on Monetary Reform, Cannan (1927 [1924], 371-2) took 
up the “gauntlet” which Keynes had thrown down.  Cannan argued that it was 
important for the stability of the financial system that the quantity theory was seen to 
be part of the body of economic theory which is perceived to be “generally true”.  
Distracting attention away from the money supply towards money demand would 
“constantly tend to make people disbelieve in the workings of the quantity theory”. 
xxxviii
    
 
In his rejoinder, Keynes (JMK XI [1924], 415, 419) argued that there could be “both 
very large and very rapid” changes in “the volume of real balances”.  Keynes 
complained that Cannan was “unsympathetic with nearly everything worth reading … 
which has been written on monetary theory in the last ten years”.  The “almost 
revolutionary improvement in our understanding of the mechanism of money and 
credit and of the analysis of the trade cycle … may prove to be one of the most 
important advances in economic thought ever made”.  Cannan was guilty of writing 
“as though the last word had been said years ago in elementary textbooks”.  In 
contrast to Cannan’s work, Keynes commended the “impressive” collection of 
opinions on the topic provided by J.R. Bellerby (1923) “from many sources”.  Cannan 
(1927 [1924], 384, 386-7) responded by purporting to analyse “what these textbooks 
really did say”.  Referring to Keynes’ 1923 “restatement of the quantity theory” and 
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heightened perceptions about the importance of hoarding and “the demand for 
currency” Cannan reported that “rummaging through old lecture notes, I find I was 
teaching it orally ten years before I put it in a book in 1918”.xxxix  
 
1.5 Other Oral Traditions   
Richard Kahn’s English translation of Knut Wicksell’s Interest and Prices was 
published in 1936.  It is possible that Keynes learnt of Wicksell’s economics through 
an oral tradition (Skidelsky 1992, 168).xl  Alternatively, Keynes may have read 
Wicksell (1907) in the Economic Journal, or an earlier German edition of Interest and 
Prices, or may have been exposed to Wicksell’s ideas through Kahn (Laidler 1991, 
149, 152, n30).  Kahn (1933, 1, 14, 6), who visited Chicago in 1932-3, also made an 
assertion about the existence of an oral tradition.  He noted that the marginal revenue 
curve had been developed by “a number of independent workers”: Edward 
Chamberlin in Harvard and Austin Robinson in Cambridge.  Kahn also “realised that 
by a curious coincidence precisely the same term was in use at Chicago” by Viner and 
Theodore Yntema.  Kahn also referred to “a general theory” and a Cambridge oral 
tradition: “Mr Shove has, by way of oral teaching, long been engaged in following up 
the same lines of thought”. 
 
Patinkin (chapter 5 [1969], 252) and his research assistant, Stanley Fischer, located a 
Chicago oral tradition in George Bach’s Chicago dissertation on ‘Price Level 
Stabilisation Some Theoretical and Practical Considerations’.  Acknowledging his 
“deep obligation” to Mints, Simon and Viner, Bach (1940, iii, 36, n1) explained that 
he was especially grateful to Mints for the “reductions to essentials” of his theory, 
“although it has been in the nature of an ‘oral tradition’ at Chicago for some time and 
can be found in many writers, but only more or less obscured. (Note, e.g. Vol 1 of 
Keynes’ Treatise)”.  This Chicago oral tradition related to psychological factors 
which changed the “propensity to hoard consume and invest”, “perverse fluctuations 
in the volume of money in the system” and “the existence of ‘sticky’ prices 
throughout large sections of the economy, of which many are cost-prices, so that costs 
have a tendency to move more slowly than do the more flexible selling prices”.  
 
This sticky price tradition played a pivotal role separating Keynes’ analysis of 
liquidity preference from his contemporaries in Viner’s (chapter 48 [1936], 240) 
review of the General Theory: “In modern monetary theory [hoarding] is generally 
dealt with, with results which in kind are substantially identical with Keynes’, as a 
factor operating to reduce the ‘velocity’ of money.  There has been, I believe, 
common agreement among economists that when price rigidities are important 
hoarding could present a serious and continuing, and that it is always a significant 
factor in the downward phase of a short business cycle.  Keynes, however, attaches 
great importance to it as a barrier to ‘full’ employment at almost all times, and 
apparently irrespective of the degree of flexibility of prices”.xli  Friedman (1968, 3) 
noted that Pigou’s analysis of the behaviour of real money balances exploded 
“Keynes’ key theoretical proposition, namely, that even in a world of flexible prices, a 
position of equilibrium at full employment might not exist.  Henceforth, 
unemployment had again to be explained by rigidities or imperfections, not as the 
natural outcome of a fully operative market process”.  
 
Simons (1948 [1944], 131-2) used sticky prices to build an expectations-augmented-
insider-outsider model of the labour market.  Where trade unions had power and 
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labour turnover was costly to firms, insiders could “insulate themselves from the 
competition of new workers merely by making their costs excessive, that is, by 
establishing labor costs and wage expectations [emphasis added] which preclude 
expansion of production or employment in their field”.  Thus outsiders (“new and 
displaced workers”) would not “typically migrate” to such firms because “jobs cannot 
be had”.  The privately optimal strategy for trade unions was to exclude “lower-wage 
competitors”.  Douglas (1935, 54-5, 61), citing Gardiner Means, also emphasised the 
causal importance of “stickiness in prices” in his Controlling Depressions.  Thus “an 
examination of the actual facts of industry” revealed that “rigid prices in the face of 
falling costs” were “probably the chief initiating causes of the present depression.xlii  
 
According to Martin Bronfenbrenner, in the late 1930s “Simons agreed with Means 
that administered prices were delaying recovery and should come down.  (But Simons 
was more down on trade union wages than on industrial prices)” (cited by Samuels 
and Medema 1990, 169, n55).  Means used this analysis to implicitly demonstrate the 
invalidity of the quantity theory: “In the modern economy, the widespread presence of 
inflexible prices makes any changes in the relation between the supply of money and 
the demand for money under given price conditions a seriously disorganising force”.  
In the “old flexible-price economy” changes in money demand or supply would lead 
to price changes which would leave production relations “essentially undisturbed”.  In 
the modern economy, a monetary contraction would dislocate the price relationships 
and produce a decline in output in the inflexible price sector (Ware and Means 1936, 
79-81).  A “serious and continuing depression” could follow such a policy.  
Alternatively, the same outcome could result from the monetary authorities failing to 
allow the money supply to keep pace with money demand, a scenario that Means 
(1935, 409-10) advanced as a partial explanation of the Great Depression.  Thus a 
stabilising monetary policy would require the authorities to adjust the money supply 
so as to eliminate any pressure towards “a general revision of prices either upwards or 
downwards” [emphasis in original]. 
 
1.6 Chicago and the Keynesian Revolution  
In his AEA Presidential Address, Knight (1951, 2-3) hinted at the existence of a 
Chicago oral monetary tradition: “It has long been my habit to mention to classes the 
sinister import of such intellectual phenomena as … the perpetual popular demand for 
making capital cheap by manufacturing money”.  Knight noted that during his career 
several “movements” had denigrated the term “orthodox” as “a ‘cuss-word’, an 
epithet of reproach … the latest ‘new economics’ and in my opinion rather the worst, 
for fallacious doctrine and pernicious consequences, is that launched by the late John 
Maynard (Lord) Keynes, who for a decade succeeded in carrying economic thinking 
way back to the dark age”.  
  
Keynes read between the lines to construct his “classical” straw man caricature.xliii  
Keynes (1936, 3, n1, 175, 177-8) opened the General Theory with the admission that 
much of what followed was possibly a “solecism” with respect to his characterisation 
of the “classical” economists in general and the “Classical Theory of the Rate of 
Interest” in particular.  But the absence of compelling textual evidence did not prevent 
Keynes from establishing a potent rhetorical device.  Thus Alfred Marshall must have 
believed that the interest rate was determined by equilibrating investment and savings 
although this explanation “is not to be found in Marshall’s Principles in so many 
words.  Yet his theory seems to be this, and it is what I myself was brought up on … 
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[Marshall] surely believed, although he did not expressly say so, that aggregate 
savings and aggregate investment are necessarily equal”.xliv   
 
In his review of the General Theory, Knight (chapter 50 [1937], 101, 114, 122, n22) 
complained that Keynes’ references to “classical economists” were “the sort of 
caricatures which are typically set up as straw men for purposes of attack in 
controversial writing”.  He sought to defend his own Chicago teaching from Keynes’ 
influence: “In the great majority of cases the doctrines so labelled [as classical] seem 
to me to be quite at variance with, and often contradictory to anything I was ever 
taught as academic doctrine in any modern sense … and they are certainly alien to 
anything I have ever taught as such, and I have been rated, and have supposed myself, 
an adherent of the general type of position referred to by the term.  On the other hand, 
many of Mr Keynes’s own doctrines are, as he would proudly admit, among the 
notorious fallacies to combat which have been considered a main function of the 
teaching of economics”.  Knight noted that “where once it was necessary in writing to 
pose as merely restating and interpreting doctrine handed down from the Fathers, the 
surest way to public interest and acclaim now lies through pulling down and 
overturning everything established or accepted”. 
 
Patinkin (like Friedman) offered a ‘Restatement’ of the doctrines of the Chicago 
Fathers.  In ‘Price Flexibility and Full Employment’ Patinkin (1952 [1948], 278), then 
an assistant professor at Chicago, concluded that “in a static world with a constant 
stock of money, price flexibility assures full employment … But in the real dynamic 
world in which we live, price flexibility with a constant stock of money might 
generate full employment only after a long period; or might even lead to a 
deflationary spiral of continuous unemployment.  On either of these grounds, a full 
employment policy based on a constant stock of money and price flexibility does not 
seem to be very promising.  All that this means is that a full employment policy 
cannot be the fairly simple one of maintaining a constant stock of money and waiting 
for the economic system to generate full employment automatically through price 
declines.  Other policies will be required.  One possible alternative policy can be 
inferred from the Haberler-Pigou analysis itself: there are two ways to increase real 
balances.  One is to keep the money stock constant and permit prices to fall.  An 
equally effective way is to maintain the price level constant, and increase the stock of 
money by creating a government deficit”.  Patinkin then added a footnote: 
“Considered from this perspective, the Pigou analysis presents in a rigorous fashion 
part of the theoretical framework implicit in the fiscal-monetary policy of the Simons-
Mints position”.  
 
Patinkin’s Restatement of the doctrines of the Chicago Fathers made an important 
contribution to the Keynesian Neoclassical Synthesis.  With respect to “the 
Keynesian-classical polemic” Patinkin (1952 [1948], 253, 257-8, 260) believed that 
he had demonstrated that “these two camps have really come closer and closer 
together”.  Patinkin also asserted that “a successful restatement of the classical 
position must demonstrate the existence of some automatic mechanism which will 
always bring about full employment … To the Keynesian negative interest rate 
argument replies had been made by both Haberler and Pigou … by changing the real 
value of cash balances, desired full employment savings and investment can always 
be equated at a positive rate of interest”.      
 
 13 
In 1947, Friedman provided Patinkin with detailed (‘early and often’) comments on at 
least two drafts of his paper.  When the essay was reprinted in an AEA volume edited 
by Friedrich Lutz and Mints (1952), Patinkin (1952, 252, n, 261) added four sentences 
“as a result of discussions with Milton Friedman” which followed from this 
discussion of cash balances: “It should also be emphasised, as Haberler does, that 
although this argument has been presented above as an answer to Keynes, it is of 
much older origin.  In particular, it is implicit in classical theorising on the quantity 
theory of money.  The crucial step in this analysis, it will be recalled, comes at the 
point where it is argued that as a result of increasing the amount of money in the 
economy, individuals’ cash balances are larger than desired at the existing price level, 
so that they will attempt to reduce these real balances by increasing their money 
expenditure.  The main contribution of Haberler and Pigou is to show how this set of 
forces must, and can, be introduced into the Keynesian analytical apparatus”.       
 
The year before the General Theory was published, Knight (1935, 236) described the 
economic doctrines of “the classical school” as “a mixture of a more or less scientific 
analysis of a price economy with what is really political propaganda for laissez-faire”.  
But as Kenneth Boulding (1956, 136, 138), one of Friedman’s fellow Chicago 
graduate students noted, the Keynesian “bulldozer” had left “the orthodox laissez faire 
man” stranded.  Alvin Hansen played the role of the “American Keynes”.  Simons 
wrote to Keynes describing himself as “a vigorous but inconspicuous participant in 
recent monetary-fiscal controversies” adding that he was “bitterly anti-Hansen and, if 
not wholly anti-Keynesian, utterly opposed to your more extreme American disciples” 
(cited by Patinkin (chapter 46 [1981/1979], 304-5).  Hansen favoured a “dynamic 
approach” - which stood in contrast to the passive acceptance of “the play of ‘natural’ 
forces … many economists are coming to think that action along these traditional 
lines would by itself be wholly inadequate.  It is increasingly understood that the 
essential foundation upon which the international security of the future must be built 
is an economic order so managed and controlled that it will be capable of sustaining 
full employment” (Hansen and Kindleberger 1942, 467).  In response, Simons (1948 
[1942], 199) referred disparagingly to “Hansen and his school”.     
 
Hansen (chapter 52 [1946], 73) also saw the post war cleavage widening: “It may now 
be useful to contrast the Mints-Simons program with that urged by [Abba P.] Lerner”.  
Howard Ellis (chapter 53 [1946], 74) saw the dispute as a confrontation between “a 
political wing favoring a very large amount of government activity, and another wing 
which, mistrustful of the concentrated power which the bureaucracy would possess 
under these circumstances, would reduce it to a minimum”.xlv   
 
In contrast, Patinkin (1952 [1948], 282) thought that “although these positions are 
quite distinct theoretically, their policy implications are very similar … Thus the 
policies may advocate tax reductions to stimulate consumption and investment (the 
Simons-Mints school); or may insist on direct government investment to supplement 
private investment (Hansen, et al.)”.  But Friedman (chapter 2 [1956]) found the 
Simons-Mints school to be the inspiration for a policy proposal (the x% money 
growth rule) which contrasted markedly with the consensual policy implication 
derived by Patinkin.   
 
Thus four paragraphs of Friedman’s introductory essay launched an intense and wide-
ranging debate that spawned important contributions to theory, methodology and the 
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history of thought, and that also profoundly influenced popular ideology and political 
action.  These two volumes are devoted to all these implications.  Section one of this 
volume reconstructs the initial controversy: Friedman’s initial essay (chapter 2 
[1956]) plus an essay on ‘The Monetary Theory and Policy of Henry Simons’ 
(chapter 3 [1967]) and the offending encyclopaedia entry on ‘The Quantity Theory of 
Money’ (chapter 4 [1968]).  Chapters 5 ([1981/1969]) and 6 ([1974/1972]) constitute 
the basis of Patinkin’s case; chapter 7 (1974/1972]) Friedman’s only published 
response.  In Chapter 8, on ‘The Keynesian Revolution and the Monetarist Counter-
Revolution’, Johnson ([1971]) expands on Patinkin’s essay original essay.  The 
following chapters by David Laidler (chapter 9 [1981]) and Tobin (chapter 10 [1981]) 
provide some additional background about the nature of the monetarist assault on 
orthodoxy.  Interestingly, Laidler – a monetarist, and a distinguished monetary 
historian – takes Patinkin’s side of the debate.  Chapters 11 and 12 set the dispute in 
the wider context of the Patinkin-Friedman friendship and the political and 
ideological disputes of the time.   
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Bach, G.L. 1940. Price Level Stabilisation: Some Theoretical and Practical 
Considerations.  Unpublished Dissertation: University of Chicago. 
 
Backhouse, R. 2002.  Don Patinkin – Interpreter of the Keynesian Revolution.  
European Journal of the History of Economic Thought Summer: 9.2: 186-202.  
 
Barro, R. 1998. Tribute on the Quad.  Hoover Digest 4: 1-9. 
 
Berle, A.A. 1973. Navigating the Rapids, 1918-71. New York: Harcourt Brace.  
Edited by B. Berle and T. Jacobs.   
 
Beschloss, M.R. and Cronin, T.E. 1989. Eds. Essays in Honor of James MacGregor 
Burns.  Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.  
 
Bellerby, J.R. 1923. Control of credit as a remedy for unemployment.  London: P.S. 
King and Son. 
 
Blumenthal. S.  1986. The rise of the counter-establishment from conservative ideology 
to political power.  New York: Times. 
 
Bornemann, A. 1940. J. Laurence Laughlin Chapters in the Career of an Economist.  
Washington: American Council on Public Affairs. 
 
Boulding, K. 1956. Economics – the Taming of Mammon.  In White ed. 
 
Burns, A.F. 1929. Quantity Theory and Price Stabilisation.  American Economic Review 
December: XIX.4: 561-79.  
 
Cannan, E. 1918. Money Its Connection with Rising and Falling Prices.  London: P.S. 
King and Son.  First edition. 
 
 15 
___ 1927. An Economist’s Protest.  London: P.S. King and Son.   
 
__ 1932. The Demand for Labour.  Economic Journal September 167.XLII: 357-370. 
 
___ 1935. Money Its Connection with Rising and Falling Prices.  London: P.S. King and 
Son.  Eighth edition. 
 
Coats, A.W. 1967. Alfred Marshall and the Early Development of the London School of 
Economics.  Economica November: 408-17.  
 
Conkin, P. 1968. The New Deal. London: Routledge and Kegan.    
 
Croome, D. R. and Johnson, H. G. 1970.  Eds. Money in Britain 1959-1969.  London: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Currie, L. 1978. Comments and Observations.  History of Political Economy 10:4: 541-
8.   
 
Dahrendorf, R. 1995. LSE A History of the London School of Economics and Political 
Science, 1895-1995. Oxford: Oxford UP. 
 
Davis, J.R. 1971. The New Economics and the Old Economists.  Ames, Iowa: 
University of Iowa Press.  
 
Dean, E. 1965. Ed. The Controversy over the Quantity Theory of Money.  London: D.C. 
Heath.  
 
Desai, M. 1981. Testing Monetarism.  London: Francis Pinter.  
 
Dorfman, J. 1959. The Economic Mind in American Civilisation.  New York: Viking. 
Volume 4.  
 
Douglas, P. 1935. Controlling Depressions.  London: George Allen and Unwin.   
 
___ 1972. In the Fullness of Time.  New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.   
 
Eatwell, J, Milgate, M and Newman, P. eds. 1987. The New Palgrave A Dictionary of 
Economics. London; Macmillan.  
 
Fisher, I. 1911.  The Purchasing Power of Money. New York: Macmillan. 
 
___ 1934. Stable Money A History of the Movement.  New York: Adelphi. 
 
Friedman, M. 1950. Wesley C. Mitchell as an Economic Theorist.  Journal of Political 
Economy  December LVIII.6: 465-493.    
 
___ 1953. Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
___ 1956. ed. Studies in The Quantity Theory of Money. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 16 
 
___ 1957. Theory of the Consumption Function. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
__ 1959. The Demand for Money: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results.  Journal 
of Political Economy 67, June: 327-51.  
 
___ 1960. A Program for Monetary Stability.  New York: Fordham University Press.  
 
___ 1962. Capitalism and Freedom.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  First 
Edition.  
 
___ 1965. The Supply of Money and Changes in Prices and Output.  In Dean ed.   
 
___ 1968. The Role of Monetary Policy. American Economic Review LVIII.1, March: 
1-17. 
 
___ 1969. Has Fiscal Policy Been Oversold?  In Friedman and Heller. 
 
___ 1972. Have Monetary Policies Failed. American Economic Review May: 11-18. 
 
___ 1974. Schools at Chicago.  University of Chicago Magazine: 11-16.  
 
___ 1977. Nobel Lecture Inflation and Unemployment.  Journal of Political Economy 
85, June: 451-72.  
 
___ 1987.  J. Laurence Laughlin.  In Eatwell et al. eds: 139-40.    
 
Friedman, M. and Friedman, R. 1962. Capitalism and Freedom.  Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.  First Edition. 
 
Friedman, M and Friedman, R. 1980.  Free to Choose: a Personal Statement. New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
 
Friedman, M. and Friedman, R. 1982. Capitalism and Freedom.  Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.  Second Edition. 
 
Friedman, M. and Friedman, R. 1984. Tyranny of the Status Quo. London: Secker and 
Warburg. 
 
Friedman, M. and Friedman, R. 1998. Two Lucky People.  Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Friedman, M. and Heller, W. W. 1969.  Monetary versus fiscal policy a dialogue.  
New York: W. W. Norton. 
 
Friedman, M. and Schwartz, A. 1963. A Monetary History of the United States.  
Princeton: Princeton UP.  
 
 17 
Fusfeld, D. 1956. The Economic Thought of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Origins of 
the New Deal.  New York: Columbia University Press.    
 
Gideonse, H.D. 1938. The Commodity Dollar. University of Chicago: Public Policy 
Pamphlet No.26.    
 
Gideonse, H.D., Hansen, A.H. and Jacoby, N.H. 1938. Purchasing Power and 
Prosperity.  University of Chicago Round Table transcript.  July 31. 
 
Gilbert, J.C. 1953. The Demand for Money: The Development of an Economic 
Concept. Journal of Political Economy April: 144-59.  
 
Ginzberg, E. 1990. Economists at Columbia: Recollections of the Early 1930s.  
American Economist: 14-19.  
 
Gould, J.M. and Kelley, A.M. 1949.  Eds. Lecture Notes on Types of Economic 
Theory As Delivered by Professor Wesley C. Mitchell.  New York: Augustus Kelley. 
Vol II.   
 
Graham, O.T. 1989.  Franklin Roosevelt and the Intended New Deal.  In Beschloss 
and Cronin eds.  
 
Greenfield, H.I., Levenson, A.M. Hamovitch, W. and Rotwein, E. Eds. 1979. Theory for 
Economic Efficiency Essays in Honour of Abba P. Lerner. London: MIT Press.   
 
Hacker, L.M. 1954. The Anticapitalist Bias of American Historians.  In Hayek ed. 
 
Hamilton, E.J. Rees, A. and Johnson, H.G. 1962.  eds.  Landmarks in Political 
Economy.  Chicago: University of Chicago.   
 
Hansen, A. H. and Kindleberger, C. P. 1942. The economic tasks of the post-war 
world.  Foreign Affairs: 466-476.  
 
Harris S. E. 1935.  Professor Pigou's Theory of Unemployment.  Quarterly Journal of 
Economics XLIV, 286-234.    
 
Harrod, R. 1951. The Life of John Maynard Keynes.  London: Macmillan. 
 
Hartwell, R.M. 1995. A History of the Mont Pelerin Society. Liberty Fund: Indianapolis.  
 
Hayek, F. A. 1939. Freedom and the Economic System. University of Chicago Public 
Policy Pamphlet No.29.    
    
___ 1944. The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: University of Chicago. 
 
___ 1954. Ed.  Capitalism and the Historians. Chicago: University of Chicago. 
 
___ 1967. Studies in philosophy, politics and economics.  London: Routledge. 
 
Heller, W. 1969. Is monetary policy being oversold?  In Friedman and Heller. 
 18 
 
Henriksson, R.G.H. 1989. The Institutional Base of the Stockholm School: The Political 
Economy Club (1917-1951).  History of Economics Society Bulletin 11.1, Spring: 59-
77.  
 
Hobsbawm, E. 1994. The Age of Extremes The Short History of the Twentieth Century 
1914-1991. London: Michael Joseph.   
 
Johnson, H.G. 1962. Monetary Theory and Policy.  American Economic Review 52: 
335-84.   
 
___ 1970. Recent Developments in Monetary Theory - A Commentary.  In Croome 
and Johnson eds. 
 
___ 1975. On Economics and Society.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Kahn, R. F.  1933. Imperfect Competition and the Marginal Principle.  Unpublished 
Mimeo.  In the Kahn Papers, Modern Archives Collection, King’s College 
Cambridge. 
 
Kaldor, N. 1970. Reply.  Lloyds Bank Review October: 54-55.  
 
Karl, B.D. 1983. The Uneasy State: The United States from 1915 to 1945. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Kemmerer, E.W. 1907. Money and Credit in Relation to General Prices.  New York: 
Holt.  
 
___ 1933. Discussion.  Federal Reserve Policy Since 1926.  American Economic 
Review March: 130-4.  
 
___ 1934a. Kemmerer on Money.  London: George Routledge and Sons.   
 
___ 1934b. Controlled Inflation. American Economic Review Supplement March: 90-
100.  
 
___ 1935. Money: the principles of money and their exemplification in outstanding 
chapters of monetary history.  New York: Macmillan. 
 
Keynes, J.M. 1923. A Tract on Monetary Reform. London: Macmillan. 
 
___ 1930. A Treatise on Money: The Applied Theory of Money. London: Macmillan. 
 
__1936. The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money. London: 
Macmillan.  
 
___ 1972-89. Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes. London: Macmillan.  
 
Keynes, J.N. 1891. The Scope and Method of Political Economy. London: Macmillan. 
  
 19 
Koopmans, T.C. 1947. Measurement without Theory. Review of Economics and 
Statistics August: 161-72. 
 
Knight, F. 1935. The Ethics of Competition and Other Essays.  Book for Libraries 
Press: New York.    
 
___ 1940. ‘What is Truth’ in Economics?  Journal of Political Economy XLVIII.1, 
February: 1-32. 
 
___ 1941. The Business Cycle, Interest and Money: A Methodological Approach.  
Review of Economic Statistics XXIII.2, May: 53-67.  
 
___ 1951. The Role of Principles in Economics and Politics.  American Economic 
Review XLI.1 March: 1-29. 
 
Laidler, D. 1991. The Golden Age of the Quantity Theory.  Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press.  
 
___ 1999. Fabricating the Keynesian Revolution: Studies of the Inter-War Literature on 
Money, the Cycle, and Unemployment.  Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
  
Laughlin, J.L. 1903. Principles of Money.  New York: Scribner’s.  
 
___  1906. Academic liberty.  Journal of political economy XIV January: 41-3.  
 
___ 1918. Credit of the Nations.  Charles Scribner’s Sons: New York.  
 
___ 1924.  Roosevelt at Harvard.  The American review of reviews October: 391-8.  
 
__ 1933. The Federal Reserve Act its Origin and Problems. New York: Macmillan.   
 
Lewis, H. G. 1946. Henry Calvert Simons.  American Economic Review September: 
668-9.  
 
Leuchtenburg, W.E. 1968. Ed. The New Deal: A Documentary History.  New York: 
Harper and Row.  
 
Lundberg, E. 1994. Studies in Economic Instability and Change.  Stockholm: SNS 
Forlag. Edited by R. Henriksson.  
 
Lutz, F and Mints, L. eds 1952.  Readings in Monetary Theory.  American Economic 
Association.  London: George Allen and Unwin.    
 
Means, G. 1935. Price Inflexibility and the Requirements of a Stabilising Monetary 
Policy.  Journal of the American Statistical Society June: 401-413.  
 
Mehrling, P.  1997. The Money Interest and the Public Interest American Monetary 
Thought 1920-1970.  Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts.  
 
 20 
___ 2001a. Don Patinkin and the Origins of Post War Monetary Orthodoxy.  Mimeo.  
 
___ 2001b. Economists and the Fed: Beginnings.  Mimeo. 
 
McCloskey, D. 1986. The Rhetoric of Economics. Great Britain: Wheatsheaf.     
 
Mints, L.W. 1945. A History of Banking Theory.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
___ 1950. Monetary Policy for a Competitive Society.  New York: McGraw Hill. 
 
Mises, L. von. 1974. Planning for freedom and twelve other essays.  Libertarian Press: 
Illinios.  
 
Mitchell, W.C. 1941. J. Laurence Laughlin.  Journal of Political Economy December: 
875-81. 
 
Moggridge, D. 1992. Maynard Keynes: An Economist’s Biography. Routledge: 
London. 
 
Nef, J. U. 1934. James Laurence Laughlin.  Journal of Political Economy 42.1, 
February: 1-5.  
 
Newman, P. Milgate, M. and Eatwell, J. 1992. eds The New Palgrave dictionary of 
money and finance.  London: Macmillan.  
 
Oakeshott, M. 1977.  Rationalism in politics and other essays.  London: Methuen and Co 
Ltd 
 
Patinkin, D.  1952. Price Flexibility and Full Employment.  In Lutz and Mints eds.  
 
___ 1956. Money Interest and Prices.  Row, Peterson: Evanston, Illinois.  
 
___ 1979. The Development of Keynes’s Policy Thinking.  In Greenfield et al. eds.   
 
___ 1981. Essays on and in the Chicago Tradition. Duke University Press: Durham, 
North Carolina. 
 
___ 1990. On Different Interpretations of The General Theory.  Journal of Monetary 
Economics 26: 205-243. 
 
__1993. On the Chronology of the General Theory.  Economic Journal May, 103.418: 
647-663. 
 
__ 1995. The Training of an Economist.  Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly 
Review December, 195: 359-395.    
 
Reagan, R. 1990. An American Life.  Random: London.  
 
Reeve, J.E. 1943. Monetary Reform Movements: A Survey of Recent Plans and 
Panaceas.  Washington: American Council on Public Affairs. 
 21 
 
Robbins, L. 1971. Autobiography of an Economist.  London: Macmillan.  
 
Robinson, J. 1962. Economic Philosophy. England: Penguin. 
 
Samuels, W. and Medema, S.G. 1990. Gardiner C. Means Institutionalist and Post 
Keynesian.  New York: M.E. Sharp.  
 
Samuelson, P. 1972. Jacob Viner, 1892-1970.  Journal of Political Economy: 5-11.  
 
Sandilands, R. 1990. The Life and Political Economy of Lauchlin Currie: New 
Dealer, Presidential Adviser and Development Economist.  Durham: Duke University 
Press. 
 
Saunders, S. 2001. Patinkin and Talmudic Readings in the History of Economics.  
Paper presented to the Patinkin conference, Lausanne, September.   
 
Schlesinger, J.R. 1956. After Twenty Years: The General Theory.  Quarterly Journal of 
Economics: 581-602. 
 
Schlesinger, A.M. 1960. The Politics of Upheaval.  Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
 
Schumpeter, J. 1954. A History of Economic Analysis.  New York: Oxford University 
Press.  
 
Selden, R.T. 1962. Stable Monetary Growth.  In Yeager ed.  
 
Schwartz, J. A. 1987. Liberal: Adolf A. Berle and the Vision of an American Era.  
London: Macmillan.  
 
Simons, H.C.  1933. Mercantilism as Liberalism.  Journal of Political Economy 
August: 548-551. 
 
___ 1934. Money and the New Deal: Review of Pasvolsky’s Current Monetary 
Issues.  New Republic February 21: 53-4.  
 
___ 1943. Postwar Economic Policy: Some Traditional Liberal Principles.  American 
Economic Review March XXXIII.1: 432-445.  
 
___ 1948. Economic Policy for a Free Society.  University of Chicago Press: Chicago. 
 
___ 1950. Federal Tax Reform.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.   
 
___ 1962. Rules Versus Authorities in Monetary Policy.  Reprinted in Hamilton, Rees 
and Johnson eds.   
 
Skidelsky, R. 1983. John Maynard Keynes: Hopes Betrayed 1883-1920.  London: 
Macmillan.   
 
 22 
___ 1992. John Maynard Keynes: The Economist as Saviour 1920-1937. London: 
Macmillan. 
 
Smith, B.D. 1992. Real Bills Doctrine.  In Newman, Milgate and Eatwell eds, vol 
3:298-300. 
Solow, R. 1964.  Friedman on America’s Money.  Banker November: 710-17.   
 
Stigler, G. 1969. Does Economics Have a Useful Past?  History of Political Economy 
1.2, Fall: 217-230. 
 
___ 1988. Memoirs of an Unregulated Economist.  New York: Basic Books 
 
Teigen, R.L. 1962. Demand and Supply Functions for Money in the United States: 
Some Structural Estimates.  Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. 
 
___ 1971. Some Observations on Monetarist Analysis.  Kredit and Kapital 4: 234-63.   
 
Tugwell, R. 1968. The Brains Trust.  New York: Viking. 
 
___ 1972. In Search of Roosevelt.  Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP. 
 
Wallis, W.A. 1976. An Overgoverned Society.  Free Press: London.  
 
Ware, C and Means, G.C. 1936. The Modern Economy in Action.  New York: Harcourt 
Brace.  
 
Whitaker, J.L. ed. 1975. The Early Economic Writings of Alfred Marshall, 1867-
1890.  London: Macmillan for the Royal Economic Society.  Volume 1. 
 
White, L.T. Ed 1956. Frontiers of Knowledge in the Study of Man.  New York: 
Harper and Brothers. 
 
White, E.N. 1983. The Regulation and Reform of the American Banking System, 
1900-1929. Princeton: Princeton UP.   
 
Whittlesey, C.R. 1935. Banking and the New Deal.  Public Policy Pamphlet No. 16.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Wicksell, K. 1907. The influence of the rate of interest on prices.  Economic Journal 
17, June: 213-20.  
 
Willis, H. P. 1896.  The History and Present Application of the Quantity Theory.  
Journal of Political Economy September: 417-448.  
 
Willis, H. P. and Chapman, J. 1934.  The Banking Situation: American Post War 
Problems and Developments.  New York: Columbia University Press. 
  
Wriston, W. 1998. Tribute on the Quad.  Hoover Digest 4: 1-9. 
 23 
 
Yeager, L.B. 1962. Ed. In Search of a Monetary Constitution.  Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard UP.  
 
                                                 
NOTES 
i
 I am grateful to seminar participants at Duke University, the Hoover Institution and 
the 2001 Patinkin conference plus Tom Cate, Roger Backhouse, Jeff Biddel, William 
Coleman, Graeme Dorrance, Mathew Forbes, Robert J. Gordon, Geoffrey Harcourt, 
Rolf Henriksson, David Laidler, Cristina Marcuzza, Perry Mehrling, Don Moggridge, 
Michael Parkin, Ron Phillips, Dominick Regan, Melvin Reder, Hugh Rockoff, 
Annalissa Rosselli, Roger Sandilands, Michael Schneider, Anna Schwartz, Frank 
Steindl, George Tavlas, Warren Young and Richard Watson.  Gloria Valentine and 
the librarians at Special Collections, Duke University, the Modern Archives 
Collection, Kings College, Cambridge and the Hoover Institution were, as always, 
most helpful.  I am grateful to the Modern Archives Collection, King’s College 
Cambridge for permission to cite from the Richard Kahn Papers, to the Special 
Collections, Duke University, for permission to cite from the Don Patinkin and 
Lauchlin Currie Papers, and to the Hoover Institution for permission to cite from the 
Friedman Papers.  I also thank Roger Sandilands for providing me with copies of 
Currie’s letters.  I am especially grateful to Milton Friedman for answering my 
detailed questions, for being so generous with his time and for allowing me to inspect 
his 1932 lecture notes which had been gathering dust for almost seven decades.  
These chapters demonstrate that economists cooperate even when they compete.       
 
ii
 The term “monetarism” was not apparently coined for another decade, by which 
time it had become a real threat to the Keynesian intellectual hegemony. 
 
iii
 Both Patinkin (1981, 261) and Rose Friedman (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 38) 
took Mints’ Economics 331, “Banking Theory and Monetary Policy”.  According to 
Milton Friedman’s academic transcript he did not attend that course for credit, but he 
recalls sitting in on the lectures (no reading lists for 331 have apparently survived in 
the Friedman Papers).  
 
iv
 One of the few changes that Friedman made between the first and the final draft of 
his December 1967 American Economic Association Presidential Address was to 
delete the reference to Knight in the opening sentence: “My revered teacher, Frank 
Knight, was fond of quoting Josh Billing’s wry comment ‘The trouble with most 
people ain’t ignorance; it’s what they know that ain’t so’.  That describes my aim to 
night: to persuade you that something you know simply isn’t so”.    
 
v
 Patinkin (chapter [1969], 256; chapter [1986], 120) misquotes this sentence twice.  
In the first instance Patinkin misquotes “affected” as “influenced”; in the second he 
misquotes “analysis” as “theory”. 
 
vi
 Both Friedman and Reagan arrived in Chicago in autumn 1932; Reagan (1990, 20) 
“hitchhiked to Chicago … with visions of getting a job as a radio announcer”.  
Starting in 1933, President Roosevelt helped re-establish confidence in the monetary 
system through “the warm and supportive simplicity of his Fireside Chat lessons” 
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administered through the radio (Karl 1983, 103).  It is interesting to note that the 
Chicago oral tradition was supposed to exist just as the radio was transforming mass 
communication in the United States.  Ten million households in the U.S. had a radio 
in 1929; twenty-seven million in 1939 (Hobsbawm 1994, 195-6).  During this period, 
an amateur monetary reformer, Father Charles Coughlin, emerged as a “radio priest” 
(Laidler 1999, 229, n20).  Coughlin’s biggest breakthrough came when he acquired 
radio access to the Chicago and Cincinnati areas in 1929-30.  By early 1934, Fortune 
estimated that he had 10 million regular listeners, probably the largest in the world 
(Reeve 1943, 132-3, 136).       
  
vii
 When Keynes (JMK XX 587) arrived in Chicago in June 1931 he found President 
Hoover’s “stock stood incredibly low.  There was not a soul who would say good 
word for him”.   
 
viii
 According to surviving lecture notes, at Harvard in 1903-4, Franklin Roosevelt had 
been taught that “The quantity theory holds” (cited by Fusfeld 1956, 31).  In 1932, 
Roosevelt was re-introduced to the quantity theory in person by Irving Fisher 
(Tugwell 1968, 98).  
   
ix
 In contrast, Reagan (1990, 230-1, 311) had both faith and a lineage.  He was aware 
that in 1981 he was facing “what many economists called the greatest economic 
emergency since the Great Depression” but he had “faith – faith in those tax cuts and 
faith in the American people”.  His supply side policies were based on his own oral 
tradition (“you say ‘I’m not gonna work for six cents on the dollar’”) with a lineage 
descending from “that philosopher, Khaldoon” a fourteenth century Muslim writer on 
taxes.   
 
x
 Friedman (1987) noted that J. Laurence Laughlin, the founding chairman of the 
University of Chicago Economics Department, exerted “no lasting influence on 
economic thought”.  He might have made an indirect impact: in 1894-5, John Neville 
Keynes considered but rejected an offer made by Laughlin to accept a chair at 
Chicago (Skidelsky 1983, 65; Moggridge 1992, 16).  It is interesting to speculate what 
the consequences for the modern configuration of economics would have been had the 
Keynes family relocated permanently to Chicago, and had Friedman’s parents not 
migrated (separately) to the United States (also in 1894-5).   
 
xi
 According to Schumpeter (1954, 223-4), the Physiocrats “formed a group united by 
what amounted to a creed; they were indeed what they were called so often, a sect ... 
[with] vows to One Master and One Doctrine ... [they were] disciples who absorbed 
and accepted the Master's teaching with a fidelity for which there are but two 
analogues in the whole history of economics: the fidelity of the orthodox Marxist to 
the message of Marx, and the fidelity of the orthodox Keynesians to the message of 
Keynes … they founded discussion groups, worked upon individuals and agencies in 
key positions (the parliaments especially) and produced a large quantity of popular 
and controversial literature [and] economic journalism”.  du Pont and his fellow 
disciples were “thoroughly alive to the importance of propaganda”.    
 
xii
 Karl Popper favoured the title “Periclean Society”; Aaron Director preferred 
“Adam Smith-Tocqueville” (Hartwell 1995, 43).   
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xiii
 Ludwig von Mises (1974 [1952], 170) recalled that at a meeting of the Mt Pelerin 
Society, T.S. Ashton, a prominent historian, presented a paper which suggested that 
much contemporary history was mere ideology, consisting of “tortured facts” and 
“concocted legends”.  Hayek also berated the “appalling effects of the use of history 
as propaganda” and there was a discussion about history being able to “demonstrate 
the importance of freedom in the past” (Hartwell 1995, 40-1, 38).  These concerns led 
to a 1954 University of Chicago volume on Capitalism and the Historians.  One essay 
focused on Charles Beard’s responsibility for cultivating the ‘Anticapitalist Bias of 
American Historians’ (Hacker 1954).  In his introductory essay Hayek (1954, 7, 9, 4) 
referred to the “socialist interpretation of history which has governed political 
thinking for the last two or three generations … Most people would be surprised to 
learn that most of what they believe about these subjects are not safely established 
facts but myths, launched from political motives”.  Historical beliefs were sometimes 
“the effects rather than the cause of political beliefs.  Historical myths have perhaps 
played nearly as great a role in shaping opinion as historical facts”. Hayek (1967 
[1944], 1) prefaced The Road to Serfdom with Acton’s dictum: “few discoveries are 
more irritating than those which expose the pedigree of ideas”.  In his review of 
Simons’ Economic Policy for a Free Society Michael Oakeshott (1977 [1949], 49-50) 
argued that it was vital to combat the “deplorable ignorance of the nature of 
libertarian tradition itself” because this lack of understanding “threatens liberty”.              
   
xiv
 Ronald Teigen’s thesis was supervised by Albert Ando and accepted by Robert 
Solow as chair of the graduate studies committee (both Ando and Solow opposed 
monetarism).  In Solow’s (1964, 710-1) judgement “Although only a small minority 
of the profession is persuaded by his opinions, around any academic lunch table on 
any given day, the talk is more likely to be about Milton Friedman than about any 
other economist”.  Teigen (1971, 244) subsequently admitted that it was “not obvious 
why monetarism had suddenly become so popular”.  Johnson’s (chapter 8 [1971]) 
critique was approvingly cited and Teigen asserted (without any supporting evidence) 
that Patinkin (chapter 5 [1981/1969]) had “shown” that Friedman’s “alleged Chicago 
oral tradition” was false.    
 
xv
 Arthur F. Burns (1929, 562) noted that it was “true” that economists “cling to one 
or another version of [the Quantity Theory] doctrine”.   
 
xvi
 Friedman (1968, 1) later used this analysis to denigrate earlier analyses: “Monetary 
policy was [perceived as] a string … You could lead a horse to water but you could 
not make him drink.  Theory by aphorism was soon replaced by Keynes’ rigourous 
and sophisticated analysis”.  Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 410-11, 171) 
reinterpreted the Great Depression as a “Great Contraction” with the money supply 
falling, rather than rising as Kemmerer suggested.  They found Kemmerer’s work 
“depressing” and unperceptive.  They concluded that his involvement in the 
establishment of the Federal Reserve System led him to believe that the system he had 
helped create had “once and for all solved problems of liquidity”.  They also noted 
that during the agitation to establish the Federal Reserve System, Kemmerer’s 
contribution to the National Monetary Commission was a monograph on Seasonal 
Variations in the Demand for Money and Capital in the United States.  Friedman’s 
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other major ideological-intellectual opponents were also associated with “systems”: 
the Bretton Woods system and the Keynesian system.                     
 
xvii
 Kemmerer (1934a, 174) was obviously proud of having been a financial adviser to 
eleven countries.  Roger Sandilands (correspondence 26 March 2002) recalls Lauchlin 
Currie complaining that Kemmerer’s advice had left a “wretched legacy” to Latin 
American. 
  
xviii
 Keynes Papers, L/K/35-8. 
 
xix
 Roy Harrod (1951, 460) criticised Keynes for seizing on “isolated passages [from 
the mercantilists] to find wisdom that was not really there”.  In response to Harrod’s 
attempt to persuade him to treat these heretics with less respect, Keynes (JMK XIII 
[1935], 650-1) wrote to Joan Robinson explaining that Harrod “strongly objected to 
chapter 26 [ultimately chapter 23 of the General Theory] as a tendentious attempt to 
glorify imbeciles.  I should like to know how it strikes you”.  Robinson replied that “I 
hope you won't let Roy intimidate you about 26.  I think it is important to have it, and 
it is very enjoyable to read.  I don't think you have overstated matters at all”. 
   
xx
  Economists (including Patinkin) often use biblical analogies: Knight (1940), for 
example, published an essay on “‘what is Truth’ in Economics?”  Patinkin (1995, 
388-9) highlighted his studies at the Hebrew Theological College at Chicago (1933-
43) as an influence on his historical studies.  Patinkin (1990, 224, n20) detected 
religious overtones in post-Keynesian writings.  With respect to the Keynesian 
revolution, Patinkin (1993, 647) referred to the struggle “for the privilege of having 
been vicariously present at that Moment of Truth ...”.  Perry Mehrling (2001a) 
recounted that Jacob Marshak declined an approached to migrate to Palestine, 
suggesting Patinkin (“an ardent Zionist”) as his replacement.  Patin kin’s first thesis 
topic was ‘The International Economic Position of Palestine’.  Patinkin’s widow 
informed me that the Federal Bureau of Investigation prevented her and her husband 
from migrating to Israel in spring 1948, because they had been procuring military 
hardware for the shortly-to-be-established State of Israel.  For a discussion of both 
‘Patinkin and Talmudic Readings in the History of Economics’ and the role of the 
“Oral Torah” in the Jewish tradition, see Saunders 2001.            
   
xxi
 Don Patinkin Papers, Box 20. 
 
xxii
 Patinkin (1979, 154) noted that Friedman had previously effected an intellectual 
revolution by having “monetary policy” redefined as relating to variations in the 
money supply rather than changes in interest rates. 
  
xxiii
 Irving Fisher was an earlier advocate of monetary rules. 
 
xxiv
 Simons (1950, 155, n23) referred to himself as “not enough of a scholar” to 
describe the sources of his ideas and having “no fear that bibliophiles will point out an 
army of unacknowledged precursors”.  The only source for his ideas on income 
taxation that he wished to acknowledge was his undergraduate teacher in accounting.  
Joan Robinson (1962, 77) noted that “Keynes himself lacked the scruple of a scholar". 
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xxv
 Don Patinkin Papers: http://scriptorium.lib.duke.edu/economists/patinkin. 
 
xxvi
 Don Patinkin Papers, Box 32. 
 
xxvii
 In 1933-4, Friedman attended Mitchell’s Columbia University course on ‘Types 
of Economic Theory’, lecture notes for which have survived for the year 1934-5.  In 
his final two sentences of the course Mitchell stated that “the people who are 
gradually accumulating this factual knowledge are … laying the basis and actively 
contributing to our economic theory at large.  I hope that every member of the class in 
the future will have some part in this work of developing economic theory” (Gould 
and Kelley 1949, 300). 
 
xxviii
 In the early 1930s, Mitchell told Erik Lundberg (1994, 497) that “we need 
another hundred years of empirical research and knowledge before we can generalise 
about causal relations on your level”.   
 
xxix
 Metzler continued: “I was quite strongly impressed, as I read your paper, by the 
similarity between the theory which you have attributed to Mitchell and Kalecki’s 
theory of the business cycle … the similarity between your version of Mitchell and 
chapter 6 of Kalecki’s book Essays in the Theory of Economic Fluctuations, is so 
striking that seems to me that it might be advisable to make a footnote to his work 
somewhere in your paper”.  Friedman (30th October 1950) replied that he was “almost 
ready to wager that there is no copy in Paris” where he was currently based and was 
therefore unable to refer to Kalecki’s book.  Milton Friedman Papers, 
Correspondence, Meltzler file.   
 
xxx
 In an interview with Jeff Biddle (October 6, 1993).  I am grateful to Biddle for 
providing me with a transcript of this interview.  
 
xxxi
 In 1879, as an instructor in political economy at Harvard, Laughlin (1924, 307) 
listened to a paper on “Taxation” presented by two undergraduates, Theodore 
Roosevelt and Robert Bacon, a future president of United States and his Secretary of 
State.  Around the same time, Laughlin (1850-1934) heard Simon Newcomb deliver 
some invited lectures at Harvard.  It was Newcomb to whom Fisher (1911) dedicated 
The Purchasing Power of Money.  When an Iowa Senator declared that the University 
of Chicago “smelled of [Rockefeller] oil” Laughlin (1906, 41) defended academic 
freedom using a monetary analogy: an elastic currency was required to reflect the 
state of the business cycle, just as tolerance was required to accommodate unpopular 
views.  His last academic appointment to Chicago was Jacob Viner (Friedman 1987).     
 
xxxii
 Wesley Clare Mitchell told Eli Ginzberg (1997, 3) that Willis had never deviated 
from the “hard money” views which he had acquired as a Chicago graduate student 
under Laughlin.   
 
xxxiii
 Willis (1874-1937) was one of the first to visit Roosevelt after the 1932 election 
(Tugwell 1972, 205).  From the outset of the Depression, Willis blamed Federal 
Reserve officials for the panic (Davis 1971, 35).  He denounced the 1935 Eccles 
banking bill as “the most dangerous, the most unwarranted, the most insidious 
measure” of the New Deal (cited by Schlesinger 1960, 297).  During Friedman’s time 
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at Columbia, Willis’ Banking Seminar produced a collaborative analysis of The 
Banking Situation (Willis and Chapman 1934).  Friedman’s (1956) Studies in the 
Quantity Theory of Money was the collaborative product of his Chicago Workshop in 
Money and Banking, founded in 1953.  Friedman attributed the “success” of his 
Workshop to the rule “no representation without taxation” (Friedman and Friedman 
1998, 208).   
 
xxxiv
 Laughlin was a “staunch conservative and Republican” (Neff 1934, 4, 1).   
 
xxxv
 Johnson (1975, 124) concluded that in the 1950s, Cambridge people were 
“perverting economics in order to defend intellectual and emotional positions taken in 
the 1930s”.  He was implicitly accusing Friedman of perverting economics by 
pretending to be merely defending an intellectual position (or framework) that had not 
been (uniquely) taken in Chicago in the 1930s.   
 
xxxvi
 In the year before Friedman’s visit to Cambridge a JPE essay on the “checkered 
career” of the concept of the demand for money also referred to “the oral tradition at 
Cambridge” with respect to Marshall’s use of the “demand-to-hold” approach in the 
decades before the publication of his 1923 Money, Credit and Commerce (Gilbert 
1953, 145).  In a 1871 manuscript on the theory of money, Marshall criticized the 
approach to the quantity theory which sought to explain the value of money by reference 
to its supply and its velocity.  Marshall objected on the grounds that “‘the rapidity of 
circulation’ is not the most convenient thing to be made the basis of our investigations”.  
Specifically, John Stuart Mill had not adequately delineated the “balancing of 
advantages” which underpinned the demand for money (cited in Whitaker 1975, 166-7). 
 
xxxvii
 The Keynes-Cannan dispute had been preceded by an earlier “institutional” 
dispute between Cannan and Alfred Marshall (Dahrendorf 1995, 211-3; Coats 1967).  
Lionel Robbins (1971, 105, 85, 83) recalled that the “slogan” at Cambridge in the 
1920s was that it was “all in Marshall” whereas Cannan emphasised “this or that 
weakness of ‘old Marshall’”.   
 
xxxviii
 Cannan (1932, 369; 1927, xiii, 253, 305, 330, 417) explained that “General 
unemployment appears when asking too much is a general phenomenon”.  He devoted 
his professional life to the cause of removing the “scales ... from the eyes of the 
people of Europe” until they forced disinflation upon their reluctant governments by 
crying: “Burn your paper money, and go on burning it till it will buy as much gold as 
it used to do”.  The “thorough deflationist” cure for the “diarrhoea of paper” would be 
disagreeable “but so is giving up the practice of over-indulgence in intoxicating 
liquor".  With respect to the unemployed 'byproduct' of this deflation: “Expectation of 
Government assistance only hinders the mobility of existing workers”.  
 
xxxix
 However, Cannan’s attempt to establish an LSE oral tradition is not supported by 
an examination of the 1918 edition of Money.  Cannan (1918, 63) explained that 
economists had “long been familiar” with the idea that the value of money depended 
“upon the various influences which affect demand and supply” and that to restrain 
prices rises the public should “insist on adequate limitation of the supply of money”.  
In the eighth edition of Money (after the publication of Keynes’ Treatise), Cannan 
(1935, 76, 92) explained that “the Quantity Theory of the value of money singles out 
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quantity as the thing on which the value of money may be said to depend, other things 
(including Demand) remaining the same.  It would be very astonishing if this were not 
true”.  Cannan believed that the demand for money was fairly stable: “in the absence 
of anticipation of future changes the elasticity of demand for money is ‘equal to 
unity’”.  Prior to his death on 8th April 1935 Cannan’s book on Money went through 
eight editions (the Preface to the last edition was dated April 1935).  During his time 
at the LSE (1922-25), Lauchlin Currie (1978, 541) found inspiration in Cannan’s 
insistence of getting “behind the Money Veil” (see the introductory chapter, part two, 
below).     
 
xl
 Erik Lundberg (1994 [1934], 48) recalled that during his time at Chicago (1931-2) 
there was “a real boom of interest in Swedish economics … especially Wicksell’s 
thoughts”.  Wicksell dominated the Stockholm Political Economy Club both through 
his writings and through “the Wicksellian oral tradition.  This oral tradition was 
probably most important in monetary theory.  It is well known that Wicksell in his last 
years expressed quite severe criticism of his own earlier work in the quantity theory 
tradition.  At that time Wicksell actually turned against the quantity theory and 
attempted to explain the development of the price level without any reference to the 
monetary factors focused on in the equation of exchange” (Henriksson 1989, 63, 67).  
 
xli
 This sticky price tradition can be found in Simons’ (1948 [1934], 64-5) ‘Positive 
Proposal for Laissez Faire’ in which he explains that it was important to consider 
“how different possible [monetary] policy rules would operate given the basic 
inflexibilities in the price structure … no monetary system, however perfectly 
conceived and administered, can make a free-enterprise system function effectively in 
the absence of reasonable flexibility in the price structure”.  It can also be found in 
Simons’ (1933, 550-1) review of Charles Beard’s America Faces the Future. It was, 
Simons stated, “perhaps an incontrovertible position that the excess of booms and 
depressions are attributable, on the one hand, to the system of commercial banking 
and, on the other, to an exceeding and increasing ‘stickiness’ in many parts of the 
price structure … many prices have become quite inflexible and especially resistant to 
downward pressure … Mr Beard beseeches us to adopt measures which will make the 
‘sticky’ prices as much stickier as possible.  To adopt such measures, while neglecting 
the problem of money and credit, is to assure the next depression will make the 
present one seem altogether trivial”.  It was a tradition that Chicago’s Greg Lewis 
(1946, 668-9) referred to in his Memorial to Simons.  Some policy implications of this 
sticky price tradition were outlined by Neil Jacoby, a Chicago Assistant Professor of 
Finance: “I think that government policy should be bent towards trying to get rid of 
these sticky, rigid elements rather than trying to increase them” (Gideonse, Hansen, 
and Jacoby, 1938, 10).   
 
xlii
 In Knight’s (1941, 59) ‘The Business Cycle, Interest and Money: A 
Methodological Approach’ there is a discussion of sticky intermediate prices and 
wages: “Wages are notoriously sticky, especially with respect to any downward 
change in the hourly wage-rates, which is the important fact in the unit cost or 
marginal cost of products”.   
 
xliii
 There is also another oral or more precisely an ethereal tradition in the General 
Theory: “Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy 
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from some academic scribbler from a few years back” (Keynes 1936, 383).   
 
xliv
 In 1956, Keynes’ caricature was defended by John Dunlop on the same grounds 
chosen by Friedman: “Keynes’ General Theory … was soon hailed as the manifesto 
of a revolution … With respect to public policy, Keynes and his followers scored a 
signal victory over the ‘price flexibility school’ but contrary to popular impression 
(carefully nurtured by Keynes’ disciples), this latter was a rather small and relatively 
powerless group … Keynes attacked the Pigovian theory – the ‘classical’ thought 
which had by then reigned supreme for but three years.  In dealing with the pre-
Pigovian theoretical treatment of wage reductions which was so meagre, Keynes 
could only pummel that convenient but difficult to define strawman, Say’s Law.  It is 
questionable whether Keynes’ caricature could be considered a fair presentation of the 
views of his postclassical predecessors”.  James Schlesinger (1956, 582, n7), the 
author of this commentary, then added the following footnote: “Dunlop has intimated 
to me that this statement is unfair to Keynes.  He points to a strong ‘body of oral 
tradition’ in favor of wage reductions and suggests that the noted article of Edwin 
Cannan, ‘The Demand for Labour’ (EJ Sept 1932, 357-70) is illustrative of this 
general attitude”.  ‘The Demand for Labour’ was Cannan Royal Economic Society 
Presidential Address delivered on 26th May 1931 (four days before Keynes left for a 
visit to the University of Chicago).   
 
xlv
 But as Ellis noted, Mints and Hansen “agree completely” about the need for federal 
deficits to combat depressions, though Hansen stressed increasing expenditures while 
Mints stressed reducing taxes.   
   
